The Eleventh Circuit Board

A jury found that Edward Walker brought three women from Connecticut to Florida to engage in prostitution, and it convicted him of three counts of sex trafficking. In US v. Walker, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the conviction. Walker contended that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he had “coerced” the women into commercial sex acts. Putting aside an issue of improper notice of expert evidence (which the panel said didn’t amount to prejudice under plain-error review), the crux of the opinion was whether Walker’s schemes were “intended to cause a person to believe that failure to perform an act would result in serious harm.” What is “serious harm,” when there were no violent acts or threats of physical injury? Here the Court said that one woman’s inability to finance a trip back home (from Florida to Connecticut) and another woman’s fear that Walker would end their romantic relationship and withhold his “emotional, psychological, and financial support” both constituted “serious harm.” The takeaway: coercion can be psychological, financial, even indirect and attenuated; when the crime seems really bad, necessary elements (coercion, here) can be found in many ways. (By Ross Brockway).

For a refresher on the categorical approach, look no further than US v. Lopez. Although the opinion addresses whether a conspiracy to commit money laundering is a crime of moral turpitude in the immigration context, the analysis of the categorical approach is the same for ACCA and sentencing guideline enhancements, including the career offender provision. “When a defendant is convicted of a conspiracy crime, the categorical approach demands . . . [that we] identify the elements of the underlying crime that the defendant was convicted of conspiring to violate.” Ultimately, the panel held that “[money laundering] is not categorically a crime of moral turpitude” for immigration purposes and vacated the district court order revoking Lopez’s naturalization. Judge Grant’s concurring opinion criticized the outcome as “another example of the absurdities that can follow from the categorical approach” and declared “[the] result is baffling.” (By Wes Bryant).

The Supreme Court held in US v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022), that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). So, what do we make of the Eleventh Circuit’s existing precedent that aiding and abetting a Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a § 924(c) crime of violence? In US v. Wiley, the panel held that the crime is still a 924(c) predicate post-Taylor. The Judge Jill Pryor-authored opinion draws a distinction between the proof required to secure a conviction for an attempt offense versus a conviction for aiding and abetting a completed offense. In order to obtain a conviction for attempted Hobbs Act robbery, the government must only prove the intent to commit the offense and the completion of a “substantial step” to that end. Neither of these elements require the government to prove that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use force. This reasoning does not apply to accessory liability in which “an aider and abettor of Hobbs Act robbery necessarily commits all the elements of a principal Hobbs Act robbery.” Therefore, aiding or abetting a Hobbs Act robbery meets the requirements of the elements clause and remains a § 924(c) predicate. (By Caitlyn Wade).

Life tip: If you threaten to kill your girlfriend if she cooperates, and do so on a recorded jail call, you can expect to be convicted of witness tampering under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(2)(A). That’s what happened to William Raymond Beach, hailing from the fair burg of Tampa, Florida. In US v. Beach, the Eleventh Circuit rejected his claim that he did not interfere with an “official proceeding” because there was only an investigation and no pending grand jury proceeding or trial; it was enough that Beach foresaw such a proceeding. The court also rejected Beach’s sufficiency claim, finding that although a nexus requirement does extend to this subsection of § 1512, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that Beach foresaw official proceedings, and had the intent to influence them. Finally, the court rejected Beach’s claim that the evidence that it was he who had placed the threatening calls to the victim was insufficient, noting that the caller had identified himself as “Billy” on each of 65 calls, and was calling Beach’s own cell phone, which he had given the victim when he was taken into custody. (By Colin Garrett).