The Eleventh Circuit Board

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BNB Quiz Questions:

1. Hypothetically, if you were busted with possession of some old cannabis stalks without any leaves on them, which law would you be violating: Federal or Georgia?

2. When may the out-of-court statements of a minor victim of a sex-trafficking offense be admitted at trial even when that victim did not testify?

3. When a federal crime is committed by an Indian, against an Indian, and in Indian country, does the federal government have jurisdiction?

Eleventh Circuit Opinions:

Because a fellow named Hicks had four Georgia convictions for possession with the intent to distribute marijuana (2000, 2007, 2009, and 2012), the district court applied the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) enhancement to his 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) sentence. On appeal, Hicks’s arguments for why he should not be ACCA-eligible included: (1) the Georgia definition of marijuana included “hemp” during the period of his convictions, while the federal definition of marijuana did not include hemp at the time the federal court sentenced Hicks (in 2023); and (2) marijuana in Georgia excludes “defoliated mature stalks,” while federally, “all mature stalks” are excluded. In US v. Hicks, why does issue (1) fail? Well, in Brown v. US, 602 U.S. 101, 123 (2024), the Supreme Court held that “a state drug conviction counts as an ACCA predicate if it involved a drug on the federal schedules at the time of that offense.” In other words, we cannot compare the state controlled-substance definition to the federal controlled-substance schedules in effect at the time of the federal crime or sentencing hearing. And at the time of each of Hicks’ state convictions, the Georgia and federal definitions of marijuana both included hemp; so, they matched. Why does issue (2) fail? The Court reasoned that the seemingly textual difference between Georgia’s “defoliated mature stalks” and the federal “all mature stalks” was a little too cute and persnickety. The panel found that both the Georgia and federal law were intended to exempt mature marijuana stalks but include marijuana leaves; so, again, the two definitions matched. [By Joe Blum].

In federal criminal trials, victim testimony does not always have to come from the witness stand. In US v. Carter, the Eleventh Circuit upheld a sex trafficking conviction even though a minor victim never testified. During a sting operation tied to a Super Bowl trafficking crackdown, officers detained the minor victim in a hotel room, she became visibly emotional, and she told officers: “[I] did not even want to come on this date and [I] was forced to.” She also said: “Look, you can see my phone. I don’t want to get anybody in trouble.” At trial, the court admitted these statements over Carter’s objection, although the minor victim did not testify. On appeal, Carter argued that the admission of these statements violated both the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause and the rule against hearsay. The Eleventh Circuit panel rejected that argument. The statements were non-testimonial because they were made in response to an ongoing emergency rather than as part of a formal effort to build a case for prosecution. The minor spoke almost immediately after officers entered the room, was highly distressed, and was not responding to structured police questioning. At the same time, the trafficker was still at large and posed a continued threat, not only to the victim but potentially to others. In that context, the court determined that the primary purpose of the interaction was to address an immediate safety situation, not to establish past facts for trial. Because of that distinction, the statements fell outside the protections of the Confrontation Clause and were admissible, even without the victim taking the stand. [By Jordan Singleton].

In US v. Brice, one of the appellants, Waggerby, contested his Hobbs Act robbery conviction. He argued that because he is an Indian, because the robbery was committed against another Indian, and because it occurred on Indian territory, the federal district court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. However, the Eleventh Circuit panel disagreed. Hobbs Act robbery is a “generally applicable criminal offense” ― i.e., an offense that applies to everyone, everywhere. Hobbs Act robbery fits within this category because, “the [location] of the offense is not an element of the crime.” Thus, “the Act applies in Indian country by its own terms, and nothing in its terms limits how it applies to Indian-on-Indian crime.” The panel further rejected Waggerby’s argument that this interpretation undermines tribal sovereignty. The panel highlighted how the United States can enforce federal law within the sovereign states, citing the fact that both federal and state governments may prosecute the same act. The power of the federal government to enforce criminal law within tribal territory no more undermines tribal sovereignty than the federal government’s power to enforce its own law in the states undermines state sovereignty. [By Keenen Twymon].

Quiz Answers:

1. Neither.

2. When those statements were made during an ongoing emergency and were non-testimonial.

3. Yes, at least when the crime is a “generally applicable criminal law.”

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