The Eleventh Circuit Board

How many of us refer to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) as the “felon-in-possession” statute? We all raise our hands, right? In United States v. Gaines, the Eleventh Circuit provided an important reminder that § 922(g) doesn’t actually use the word “felon.” Instead, the statute prohibits individuals who have been previously convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” from possessing firearms. Gaines was previously found guilty of a Class D felony in Alabama. When he was later found in possession of a firearm, the government believed he violated § 922(g). In Lee Corso’s immortal words: Not so fast! The panel held that a court must make a “defendant specific” analysis in determining whether a prior conviction renders someone a prohibited person. This was good news for Gaines because under Alabama law he could not have received a sentence of imprisonment for his prior Class D felony since he lacked the requisite criminal history. In short, Gaines was a “felon” but not subject to the restrictions of § 922(g). [By Caitlyn Wade].

A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs when an officer either uses physical force to seize someone or when the person submits to the officer’s assertion of authority. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991). In Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306 (2021), the Supreme Court held that officers seize a person when they exert physical force by shooting her with a firearm as she flees what she thinks is a carjacking. But what if someone flees plain-clothes officers in the pitch dark, officers who don’t identify themselves, who fire multiple times at the suspect, and whose bullets miss her, but hit her hatchback? In Watkins v. Davis, the Eleventh Circuit, using tort law and historical cases about horses and carriages, held that a person is seized whether she is shot and injured or only her car is perforated. Officers must intend to restrain the person, but if they are shooting a firearm, that intent is clear. Because Watkins also stopped once she saw police cars and realized it was police who were shooting at her, she submitted to a show of authority. How far does this rule go? Is a person also seized when police officers hit her car with theirs or if they tase her? Using the tort law and Torres and Watkins, a lawyer would have a good argument that the client was seized under the Fourth Amendment. Force becomes a seizure with any touching and with the intent to restrain the freedom to leave. So, check that body camera footage and parse those police reports! The seizure may have started earlier than you think. [By Nicole Kaplan].

The opinion in United States v. Rodriguez-Martinez is full of all your favorite legal fictions, starting with Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)’s “other purposes” clause, followed by the fairy tale power of the almighty limiting instruction. Unlike typical fairy tales, however, the opinion has no happy ending for Rodriguez-Martinez. Remember that evidence of other crimes is admissible under Rule 404(b) only to prove something other than propensity, such as intent. The Eleventh Circuit has said (and reasserts here) that prior drug convictions are fair game under Rule 404(b) where the accused is being charged with a new drug crime and the drug-related prior conviction is being used to prove intent. So, after striking out with Rule 404(b), Rodriguez-Martinez argued that his prior conviction should be excluded, too, under Rule 403. He pointed to the prosecution’s overwhelming evidence against him as proof that evidence of his drug prior was unnecessary and thus substantially more prejudicial than probative. The panel disagreed, finding the prosecution’s evidence did not necessarily go to prove intent. For good measure, the panel added that any unfair prejudice caused by admitting the prior conviction was magically cured by the lower court’s limiting instruction. Ever the fighter, Rodriguez-Martinez took one final swing and argued that the district court erred in calling his drug prior a “conviction.” Unfortunately, Rodriguez-Martinez himself (well, his lawyer) called the first offender prior event a “conviction” in pleadings and again in a joint stipulation. The panel found that Rodriguez-Martinez invited the error and ended his hopes of a fairy-tale ending. [By Chelsea Champion].