The Eleventh Circuit Board

It turns out that a district court may enjoy two pieces of pie from a single supervised release revocation petition. In United States v. Murat, our hero faced a petition listing both technical violations and new criminal conduct. The district court revoked Murat’s supervision on the technical violations and imposed a sentence of five months in prison, plus another 54 months of supervision. The court held the criminal conduct violations in abeyance. On Murat’s last day in prison, the court brought him to a second hearing on the remaining violations, revoked again, and added four more months in prison, followed by 48 months of supervision. On appeal, Murat objected to the bifurcated process, and argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to conduct the second hearing. The Eleventh Circuit held that a district court is not limited to one piece of pie; it’s free to save a second piece for a later revocation hearing. The district court retained jurisdiction to conduct the second hearing because (1) a revocation of a term of supervised release does not terminate it, per the Supreme Court in Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000); (2) the revocation petition was timely filed as to all the violations, so the time was necessarily tolled for a later revocation; and (3) no circuit has held that a district court lacks jurisdiction to conduct a second revocation on a timely-filed petition. [By Suzanne Hashimi].

Under the Fourth Amendment, a search warrant for a home must be based upon probable cause. The “nexus” requirement means the facts must “establish a connection between the defendant and the residence,” as well as “a link between the residence and any criminal activity.” Unfortunately, police officers require less proof of that connection than you might think. In United States v. Holmes, the Eleventh Circuit upheld a search warrant for a residence based only on circumstantial links and investigative common sense. Holmes was under investigation for arson and drug dealing. Officers watched him exit a home, get into a car parked out front, and drive away. After a traffic stop, officers found drugs and a firearm in the car, then obtained a warrant to search the residence Holmes had just left. Holmes challenged the warrant, arguing that the home wasn’t his and that the connection was too weak to justify the search. The panel disagreed. The warrant included probable cause on the nexus requirement for three thin reasons. First, officers were still investigating the arson, they had not yet recovered physical evidence, and the victim identified Holmes as the suspect and said he lived at this very house. Second, officers knew Holmes had a history of dealing drugs, so it was reasonable to believe evidence of drug activity might be found at the house. Third, police saw Holmes leave the house and get into a parked car linked to the arson. The holding is a powerful reminder that a search warrant application does not require direct proof of residency or certainty that evidence will be found, but only a fair probability based on the facts available to law enforcement. [By Jordan Singleton].

This new opinion sets off all sorts of alarm bells. In United States v. Mims, the court sentenced Mims (in 2017) to three years of probation and $200,000 of restitution. Mims completed the probation (in 2020), and, by that time, she had paid off $50,000 of the restitution. Then she stopped making restitution payments entirely. Several years passed. The government, rather than pursuing civil remedies (its usual path), asked the sentencing judge to order Mims to begin making payments again. Mims objected and argued that because the sentence was complete, the criminal court lacked jurisdiction to make her do anything, including pay restitution. If the government wanted to collect the money, said Mims, it should file a civil action like any other creditor. The district court granted the government’s motion and ordered a new set of restitution payments. (Not sure how the court will enforce the payments because it cannot revoke probation after the fact, right? Maybe contempt proceedings?) The Eleventh Circuit affirmed and held that because a district court possesses “ancillary jurisdiction” over its cases (an unwritten power, and this is the dangerous part, that lies outside the United States Code), Mims’ court was empowered to step in long after the sentence expired to enforce its own original judgment: “The ancillary-jurisdiction doctrine recognizes federal courts’ jurisdiction over some matters (otherwise beyond their competence) that are incidental to other matters properly before them. This doctrine enables a court to function successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees.” One silver lining: Next time one of our judges says she wants to give a longer (rather than shorter) term of supervised release or probation because the client owes lots of restitution, now you can say: No problem, Judge. You can give a shorter term now, and then you can consider enforcing the restitution obligation later. [By Matthew Dodge].